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1. See e.g. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1761–
62 (2010).
2. Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 22
(quoting Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R., 2005 SCC, ¶ 47) (emphasis added).
3. Singleton v. R., 2001 SCC 61 at ¶¶ 59–61 (discussing this unified approach).
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In the United States, courts have been divided between the
new-textualist and purposive approaches to statutory
interpretation, although currently the new-textualist approach
appears to dominate.1 This paper encourages courts using either
approach to consider adopting the “unified textual, contextual
and purposive approach to statutory interpretation”2 (also
referred to as the “words-in-total-contexts approach”3), as it has
been developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years.
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II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
NEW TEXTUALIST AND PURPOSIVE APPROACHES
The common objective of all approaches to statutory
interpretation is “to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent
wherever possible.”4 This common objective is typically
referred to as a cardinal rule of interpretation. The approaches
differ, however, in their conception of the legislative intent as
well as in their method of ascertaining that intent. And the
various ways in which to interpret statutes all fit within the
broad categories of either the textualist or the purposive
approach.5
The legal systems of the past were usually dominated by a
“word-oriented (i.e. objective) approach” to interpretation.6 This
objective approach, which is broadly referred to in the United
States as textualism, is based on the plain-meaning rule.
Textualism has evolved over time from the traditional approach
(commonly referred to as old textualism), which relies on a soft
plain-meaning rule, to the more recent new textualism, which
relies on a hard plain-meaning rule.7
According to the traditional textualist approach, the goal of
statutory interpretation was to identify and give effect to the
intent and purpose of the enacting Congress based on the plain
meaning of the statutory text, derived by using the aid of
dictionaries and generally accepted conceptions of ordinary
parlance.8 Yet, the courts using this approach would also consult
35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 5 Side B
11/14/2014 10:49:45

4. Bankers Trust of S.C. v. Bruce, 267 S.E.2d 424, 425 (S.C. 1980).
5. See e.g. Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law chs. 7, 8 (Princeton U.
Press 2005).
6. Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the
Civilian Tradition 621 (Oxford U. Press 1996).
7. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621
(1990) (discussing history of textualism).
8. Id. at 626–27 (noting that the Warren and Burger Courts often consulted legislative
history to confirm that Congress intended particular statutory language to have its plain
meaning); see also John J. Dichello Jr., Student Author, Crossing Textualist Paths: An
Analysis of the Proper Textualist Interpretation of “Use” under Section 3B1.4 of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines for “Using” a Minor to Commit a Crime, 107
Dickinson L. Rev. 359, 363 (2002) (referring to “competing textualist interpretations set
forth by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits”).
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the legislative history9 in order to check for evidence of
congressional intention inconsistent with the intention conveyed
by the plain meaning of the words.10 If such inconsistency is
found, then under this traditional approach, “the plainest
meaning can be trumped by contradictory legislative history.”11
This result, which led to characterizations of the old textualists’
reliance on the statute’s plain meaning as soft, was exemplified
by cases such as INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca12 and TVA v. Hill.13
By the 1980s, the traditional textualist approach attracted
significant criticism,14 which influenced some members of the
United States Supreme Court—notably Justice Scalia—to
increasingly replace the old textualism with a new approach.
This new textualism “favors understanding the text the way a
reasonable reader would have read it at the time it was enacted,”
and its adherents’ goal “is not to discover . . . what the
legislature wanted, but rather what it said.”15 Indeed, if asked
how a court—presumed to embody the reasonable person16—
should ascertain the intention conveyed by the plain meaning of
a statute, the new textualists’ reply is that judges “must study the
language of the text as a whole, and if the statute is plain, they
should give it its plain meaning”; that “[t]hey may also consult
dictionaries and linguistic aids to equip themselves with
information about how readers understood the statute at the time
of its enactment”; and that “[t]hey may consult interpretive
maxims in effect at the time of enactment.”17 New textualists
35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 6 Side A
11/14/2014 10:49:45

9. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 636–37 (indicating that extrinsic sources from which courts
reconstruct legislative history could vary considerably, through different weight would be
given to sources depending on their perceived reliability, and noting that Congressional
committee reports are frequently cited and relied on because they are generally regarded as
reliable and authoritative).
10. Id. at 627.
11. Id. at 626 (suggesting that this override is the essence of the soft plain-meaning
approach).
12. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
13. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
14. See e.g. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 642–50 (summarizing realist, historicist, and
formalist critiques).
15. Barak, supra n. 5, at 277.
16. See e.g. Vector Gas Ltd. v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, [2010] NZSC 5, ¶ 19
(Tipping, J.) (noting that a court “embodies” the “reasonable and properly informed third
party” whose understanding of language should control).
17. Barak, supra n. 5, at 278.
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believe in addition that “a text cannot be understood out of
context,” and “permit interpreters to consult other statutes
passed by the legislature, in order to draw inferences from the
legislature’s use of similar language.”18 They do not, however,
“allow interpreters to consult legislative history or the system’s
fundamental values as they existed at the time of
interpretation.”19 Thus, “[e]ven when the plain language leads to
absurdity, or when the language is unclear, interpreters may not
consult legislative history or fundamental values,” and “have no
choice but to say that the issue lies beyond the reach of the
statute”20 if they are acting in accordance with new-textualist
principles.
Therefore, reliance on the plain meaning of statutory text
has moved farther toward the hard end of the analytic scale
under the new-textualist approach.21 Not only will judges who
follow this approach not replace the plain meaning of terms with
a constructed legislative intent based on the legislative history,
they will not even consider the legislative history unless the
statutory terms are ambiguous or absurd, or if their plain
meaning seems unreasonable.22 As the Supreme Court of the
United States has held,
[t]he preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires
us to “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.” . . . Thus,
our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as
23
well if the text is unambiguous.

11/14/2014 10:49:45

18. Id. at 278–79.
19. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 656–67; see also Congressional Research Service, Statutory
Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends 3 (Aug. 31, 2008) (recognizing that
“the Court has begun to place more emphasis on statutory text and less emphasis on
legislative history and other sources ‘extrinsic’ to that text”).
22. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 658–59.
23. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. U.S., 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citations omitted); see also
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Bedroc).
24. Barak, supra n. 5, at 260.
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Some judges have, however, resorted to the purposive
approach to interpretation, which requires the court to ascertain
and give effect to the actual intention of Congress.24 Justice
Breyer, for example, acknowledges that judges “should not
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substitute” their own policy views “for the statute that Congress
enacted,”25 but takes the position that the Court’s members
“certainly should consider Congress’ view of the policy for the
statute it created” and should remember that the legislators’
view “inheres in the statute’s purpose.”26 He notes that
“[s]tatutory interpretation is not a game of blind man’s bluff,”
concluding that “[j]udges are free to consider statutory language
in light of a statute’s basic purposes.”27
This focus on ascertaining the actual intentions of the
enacting Congress results in a “willingness to consider an array
of extrinsic interpretative aids, including legislative history.”28
Moreover, a purposivist would “generally feel freer to go
beyond the confines of statutory text and will not necessarily
find that text trumps contradictory evidence of purpose.”29
III. THE APPROACH TO CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A DIFFERENT TREND

11/14/2014 10:49:45

25. Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct.
2326, 2343 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S.
468, 484 (2003)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Gluck, supra n. 1, at 1764.
29. Id.
30. See e.g. Vision Info. Servs., LLC. v. C.I.R., 419 F.3d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Pickren v. U.S., 378 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1967): “The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of contract is to ascertain the mutual intention of the parties and then, so far
as it is possible so to do consistently with legal principles, give effect to that intention.”).

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 7 Side A

The cardinal rule that guides statutory interpretation—
intent—also guides the interpretation of contracts.30 Not
surprisingly, the question of how to approach the interpretation
of the parties’ intention in a contract has also been debated. At
one end of the debate were advocates—most notable being
Professor Williston—of the plain-meaning approach, which
resembles textualism. At the other end of the debate were
advocates—most notable being Professor Corbin—of the
modern approach, which resembles the purposive approach.
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A. Williston
According to Williston, the courts must ascertain and give
effect to the objectively manifested intentions of the parties, as
they were conveyed by the terms of the contract, either
expressly or by implication.31 To clarify, the objective intentions
are those that a reasonable person would have identified based
on the plain meaning of the terms of the contract.32 Hence,
Williston believed that a court should not be concerned with the
parties’ actual subjective intentions, except to the extent that
those were objectively manifested through the terms of the
contract. Where, however, the parties’ intentions could not be
derived from the plain meaning of the terms, Williston
instructed judges
to use “secondary” canons of interpretation, which did not
inquire as to the actual intent of the parties, but instead
reflected generalizations about the use of language and
judicially-created normative views about how contracts
33
ought to be drafted.

Because this approach is focused on ascertaining and
giving effect to intentions that are objectively manifested by the
plain meaning of the terms of the contract, extrinsic evidence
should not be admissible “to prove the actual intent of the
parties.”34 It is the intent conveyed by the terms that must be
ascertained and given effect.

In contrast to Williston, Corbin argued that the courts must
ascertain and give effect to the parties’ actual subjective intent.

11/14/2014 10:49:45

31. Stephen R. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 Geo. L.J. 195, 197 (1998).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 201 (footnote omitted). Those secondary canons included “construe so as not
to conflict with the main purpose of the contract; pay attention to grammar and
punctuation; the specific governs the general; construe against the drafter; written matter
trumps printed matter; and prior clauses trump latter clauses.” Id. at 201 n. 25 (noting in
addition that “Williston also employed the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis (words
should be given a meaning consistent with surrounding words) . . . a technique common to
statutory interpretation as well”).
34. Id. at 202.

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 7 Side B
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To ascertain their actual intentions, the court must take into
account not only the terms of the contract (i.e. terms within the
four corners of the agreement that make up the agreement’s
internal contexts) but also extrinsic evidence of the agreement’s
relevant external contexts (commonly referred to as its “factual
matrix,” “matrix of facts,” and “surrounding circumstances”)
irrespective of whether the contractual terms were ambiguous.35
There has been a growing gravitation in the United States
towards this modern approach to contractual interpretation. The
California courts, for example, were early adopters,36 and the
modern purposive approach has been embraced by the
Restatement as well.37
C. The Implications for Statutory Interpretation
One commentator has noted that “American law is ready to
consult authorial intent in contracts and wills,” and wondered
why it is “unwilling to do so for statutes and for the
Constitution.”38 The analysis that follows addresses this inquiry
by (i) distinguishing statutory interpretation from contractual
interpretation and (ii) demonstrating that statutory interpretation
requires the flexibility of a unified textual, contextual, and
purposive approach rather than either a textual or purposive
approach alone.
35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 8 Side A
11/14/2014 10:49:45

35. Id. at 203–05.
36. The California trend was apparent by the late 1960s. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v G.
W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (“If words had absolute
and constant referents, it might be possible to discover contractual intention in the words
themselves and in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have
absolute and constant referents.”).
37. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b (ALI 1981) (providing that “[a]ny
determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in light of the relevant
evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction,
preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of
dealing between the parties”).
38. Barak, supra n. 5, at 277. Others have of course explored this same question. See
e.g. Ross & Tranen, supra n. 31, at 199, 222 (arguing that there is a “strong analogy
between contract and statutory interpretation” and concluding accordingly that an approach
akin to the modern purposive approach to contractual interpretation—and not the new
textualist approach—ought similarly to apply to statutory interpretation).

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 8 Side B
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IV. THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED APPROACH TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Recall that the interpretation of both statutes and contracts
is driven by the same cardinal objective of giving effect to the
authors’ intentions. Notwithstanding this common objective,
however, courts must be mindful that different instruments serve
distinctive functions and have distinctive characteristics, which
may necessitate different approaches to interpretation.39 The
interpretation of commercial contracts necessitates ascertaining
the historical intentions of the parties. In contrast, the
interpretation of statutes may, depending on how the terms of a
statutory provision have been phrased, necessitate ascertaining
the historical intentions of the legislature or, alternatively, may
necessitate having the court apply a dynamic interpretation.
These dual functions of courts require the flexibility of a unified
textual, contextual, and purposive approach to interpretation.
A. Interpretation of Contracts: Theory and Mechanics

[p]articularly in the field of commerce, where the parties
need to know what they must do and what they can insist
on not doing, it is essential for [the parties] to be confident

11/14/2014 10:49:45

39. See e.g. Barak, supra n. 5, at 185.
40. Charter Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Fagan, (1997) AC 313, 388 (Lord Mustill, J.).

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 8 Side B

When parties negotiate the terms of their commercial
contract, they—presumably—are not intending to leave it up to
the courts to sort out and apply some broad policy objectives.
Rather, they—presumably—rely on having a court give effect to
their bargain, though the court may be expected to try to resolve
inadequacies in how the terms have been expressed in order to
give effect to the contract. Thus, the court’s “task is to discover
what the parties meant from what they have said,” without
imposing on the contract’s words “a meaning which they cannot
fairly bear,” because the latter would be “to substitute for the
bargain actually made one which the court believes could better
have been made.”40 The court must remember, then, that

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 9 Side A
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that they can rely on the court to enforce their bargain
41
according to its terms.

It can therefore be asserted that generally, when
interpreting a commercial contract, the function of the court is
confined to ascertaining the parties’ historical intention as it
existed when the parties entered into the contract. One
commentator eloquently described this historical intention as
“permanently set,” and noted that it “can never be changed with
the passage of time” because “[t]he interpreter’s role resembles
that of an historian, or an archeologist, in quest of an ancient
thought of which the enactment may contain traces.”42
B. Interpretation of Statutes: Theory and Mechanics

11/14/2014 10:49:45

41. Id.
42. Randal N. Graham, A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 23 Statute L. Rev.
91, 93 (2002) (quoting Pierre André Coté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada 6
(2d ed. Editions Yvon Blais, Inc. 1992)).
43. For more about SAARs, see Brian M. Studniberg, Minding the Gap in Tax
Interpretation: Does Specificity Oust the General Anti-Avoidance Rule Post-Copthorne? 38
Queen’s L.J. 209 (2012).
44. Income Tax Act, pt. XVI, § 245(3)(a).

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 9 Side A

Unlike parties to contracts, legislators often pursue their
objectives in statutes by means of, on the one hand, specific and
detailed rules and, on the other hand, vague rules or policies.
This paradox is exemplified by statutory regimes around the
world that are designed to combat tax-avoidance transactions. It
is commonplace for countries to have Specific Anti-Avoidance
Rules (SAARs),43 and increasingly, countries have also been
introducing General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs). Whereas
a SAAR applies to a specific and defined type of transaction, the
GAAR will set a vague standard of what constitutes tax
avoidance, and this standard could apply to a wide and openended spectrum of unforeseeable transactions.
In Canada, for example, a transaction is an “avoidance
transaction” if, but for section 245 of the Income Tax Act, it
“would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit.”44 When
the Minister of National Revenue alleges that a transaction is an
avoidance transaction as set out in section 245(3), the burden is
on the taxpayer to prove otherwise on the basis that the
transaction can “reasonably be considered to have been

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 9 Side B
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undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other
than to obtain the tax benefit.”45 If the taxpayer fails to prove
that the transaction is not an “avoidance transaction,” then the
Minister has the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities,
that the avoidance transaction would result in an abuse or misuse
(either directly or indirectly) of a provision in any of the
instruments specified in section 245(4), which includes the
ITA.46 If the Minister fails in this task, the taxpayer would not
be denied the tax benefit even though the transaction was an
avoidance transaction.47 But if the Minister proves that the
avoidance transaction resulted in misuse or abuse of the relevant
provision, then the taxpayer can be denied the tax benefits from
the transaction.48
What constitutes “misuse” or “abuse”? The approach to
determining whether a transaction results in a misuse or abuse
for the purposes of section 245(4) was explained by the SCC in
Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen.49
Commentators have criticized the rule as being too vague,50 a
critique that is equally relevant to other GAARs around the
world.51

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 9 Side B
11/14/2014 10:49:45

45. Id.
46. Lipson v. R., [2009] 1 SCR 3, 2009 SCC 1 (CanLII), ¶ 21.
47. Id. at ¶ 25.
48. Income Tax Act, pt. XVI, § 245(2).
49. [2005] 2 SCR 601, 2005 SCC 54 (CanLII), ¶ 44 (making clear that courts should
use “a contextual and purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act that are relied
on” by first determining “their object, spirit and purpose,” and then determining “whether
the transaction falls within or frustrates that purpose”).
50. See e.g. Brian J. Arnold, The Canadian Experience with a General Anti-Avoidance
Rule 3 (Oxford U. Centre for Business Taxation 2007) (discussing abuse standard
articulated in § 245, and arguing that it should apply even when an abuse is inserted into a
series of legitimate transactions).
51. See e.g. Ltr. from William J. Sampl, Chair, Taxn. Comm., U.S. Council for Intl.
Bus., to Ram Mohan Singh, Additional Dir. of Income Tax–Intl. Taxn., IRS (India), http://
www.uscib.org/docs/Final_letter_GAAR_7_19_12.pdf (July 19, 2012) (cautioning India’s
IRS that provisions in its proposed GAAR guidelines are “extraordinarily broad” and “too
vague”) (accessed Aug. 1, 2014; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). As India’s proposed GAAR is set to come into effect in April 2015, some argue
that this move should be deferred and rethought. See Pravin Agrawal and Namrata Arora,
Budget 2014–15: What Corporate India Wants, on TaxIndiaOnline.com, http://www.tax
indiaonline.com/RC2/inside2.php3?filename=bnews_detail.php3&newsid=20874 (July 9,
2014) (“There are many provisions under GAAR that may be considered vague and
unclear. If clear guidelines are not put in place, it would lead to uncertainty in the tax
system and an additional risk leading to hampering the confidence of the investors. As an

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 10 Side A
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In statutes, this use of vague statements or words is
unlikely to be the result of bad draftsmanship. Rather, vagueness
is likely an intentional tool of draftsmanship by which the
legislature invites—or relies on—the courts to assume an
interpretative role that is more dynamic then that presumably
expected from the courts by parties to a commercial contract.
This sort of dynamic interpretation “permits the interpreter to
select a construction that fits with current needs and departs
from historical expectations” while also permitting the court to
mould interpretation of the statute
in response to “needs which are identified at the time the
rule is being applied, either with reference to the current
rather than the historic will of the legislature, or with
respect to what the interpreter considers is dictated under
52
the circumstances.”

This view of legislation assumes that “statutory language must
grow and adapt in response to changing social conditions . . .
[and] views the author’s intent as merely one (marginally
relevant) element of construction” because “[t]he drafters’
understanding of the statute” is “merely one potential
construction.”53 Thus, “[a]s time passes and the text is applied to
new situations, the statute’s meaning adapts to become
something more than what the drafters first intended.”54
To emphasize, dynamic interpretation of a statute is
typically triggered, or prompted, by the legislature’s use of
vague language.55 But the use of vague language in statutory
35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 10 Side A
11/14/2014 10:49:45

immediate step the implementation of GAAR needs to be deferred and the provisions could
be rolled out later after suitable appraisal and discussions.”) (accessed Aug. 1, 2014; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
52. Graham, supra n. 42, at 105 (quoting Coté, supra n. 42).
53. Id.
54. Id. In the same vein, Professor Eskridge has written about several examples of the
manner in which dynamic interpretation can cause a statute to grow in ways that conflict
with the drafters’ expectations. Perhaps his most striking example is the evolution of
§ 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 51–52 (Harv. U. Press 1994).
55. Vagueness is of course distinguishable from ambiguity. “[W]here language leaves
the interpreter with a choice between an easily ascertainable number of specific
interpretative choices, the problem can be attributed to ambiguity. Where the language
being interpreted leads to a broad continuum of meanings (giving rise to ‘marginal
questions of degree’), the problem can be attributed to language that is vague.” Graham,
supra n. 42, at 121.
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provisions “does not necessarily imply a lack of skill on the part
of the statute’s drafters.”56 Indeed, by employing vague
language, the legislature may be “sending signals to the courts
that should help the judiciary select the appropriate method of
resolving interpretative problems” because
vague language may actually imply that the legislature’s
intent (which is the touchstone of originalist construction)
was to permit the use of dynamic interpretation and to
acknowledge the role of judicial “creativity” in the
construction and application of legislation.57

Consider, for example, these four situations in which a
legislature may choose vague language:
When drafting a statute “involves hard political
choices, vagueness may be employed as an
expedient drafting tool to delay the choices by
remitting them to future judicial construction”;58

x

When it is the legislature’s intention “to grant
discretion to the courts and other officials charged
with the task of administering legislation,” vague
language may appear in a statute because “[o]nly a
rough idea of the legislature’s meaning has been
established, with the details left to be worked out
by the courts or administrative officials”;59

x

When a legislature seeks “to delegate its powers to
judicial or administrative bodies” because its
members “recognize their own inability to predict
the practical ramifications of legislation” and know
that “the members of the judiciary (or other
individuals charged with administering and
enforcing legislation) often have the experience and
the knowledge that are required to apply vague

11/14/2014 10:49:45

Id.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 123.
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statutory language in a manner that is appropriate,”
vague language may be a proper choice;60 and
When drafters intend to “permit the language of an
enactment to take on a life of its own,” an
alternative ignored by originalists, who fail to
account for “the possibility that the framers were
content to leave the detailed application . . . to the
courts of the future,” even knowing that those
courts might “apply the text in ways unanticipated
at the time of drafting.”61

V. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA: THE GAAR AS ILLUSTRATION
Parliament’s use in § 245(4) of the terms “misuse” and
“abuse,”62 which set a vague standard of what constitutes tax
avoidance, appears to have been for the purpose of delegating
the task of filling in the legislative blanks to the judiciary. That
is, the GAAR makes it possible for legislatures to defer to the
courts the task of determining, on a case-by-case basis, the
circumstances in which a transaction amounts to misuse or
abuse. Parliament benefits from having the courts exercise this
role because it is not possible for the legislature to anticipate
every possible variation of tax-avoidance schemes.63

35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 11 Side A
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60. Id. To illustrate this point, Professor Graham points out that “disturbing the peace is
not defined” in the Criminal Code, and neither does it “describe how one could disturb the
peace in a ‘tumultuous’ manner.” He concludes in consequence that “[i]n instances such as
these, the drafter has used an extremely broad term for the purpose of delegating the task of
filling in the ‘legislative blanks’ to the judiciary.” He posits legislators’ understanding that
“[j]udges are able to determine what ‘disturbs the peace tumultuously’ because of their
great experience adjudicating offences against the public order,” and suggests that “[t]he
legislature, by contrast, has neither the expertise nor the inclination to define these vague
terms with specificity.” Thus, “[t]hrough the use of the vague language found in such
provisions, the legislature acknowledges the judiciary’s expertise and grants the courts the
discretion to apply and interpret the law as they see fit.” Id.
61. Id. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. For a general discussion of Canada’s GAAR, see section IV(B), supra.
63. See e.g. Aviv Pichhadze & Amir Pichhadze, Economic Substance Doctrine: Time
for a Legislative Response, 48 Tax Notes Intl. 61 (Oct. 1, 2007); see also Rebecca Prebble
& John Prebble, Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance
Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study, 55 St. Louis U. L.J. 29
(2010). The bottom line is that had Parliament known of a particular scheme in advance, it
could have responded by enacting a SAAR. The GAAR’s broad language could be seen as
intended to give courts authority to deal with new tax-avoidance schemes as they appear.
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64. Arnold, supra n. 50, at 3.
65. Jinyan Li, “Economic Substance”: Drawing the Line between Legitimate Tax
Minimization and Abusive Tax Avoidance, 54 Canadian Tax Journal 23, 56 (2006).
66. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935) (indicating that a taxpayer
may attempt to decrease or avoid taxes but not to evade them, and characterizing the
transaction before the Court as “devious” and concluding that it was “outside the plain
intent of the statute”).
67. 2005 SCC 54.
68. Li, supra n. 65, at 30.
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It should not be assumed, however, that courts will
necessarily engage in dynamic interpretation just because a
statutory provision is phrased vaguely. With respect to the
GAAR, for example, numerous commentators have argued that
for the GAAR to be effective it should apply to any transaction
that lacks economic substance, even though the transaction was
carried out using a valid legal form. One expert maintains, for
example, that “[a]ny GAAR or general anti-avoidance doctrine
must consider the economic substance of transaction[s] if it is to
be effective.”64 Another opines that the economic-substance
doctrine “offers the best standard for drawing the line between
legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance.”65 The
application of this economic-substance doctrine is not novel. It
has already been applied in several jurisdictions. Most notably,
the United States Supreme Court articulated the doctrine as far
back as 1935.66 In Canada, though, the ITA does not explicitly
specify whether a transaction that lacks economic substance
amounts to an abusive tax-avoidance transaction. Due to the
GAAR’s vagueness, this question would have to be determined
by the courts.
The SCC’s first opportunity to address this question was in
Canada Trustco,67 in which the SCC could have applied the
economic-substance doctrine through judicial statutory
interpretation.68 This possibility led to great anticipation. Yet,
despite Parliament’s vague language, which may be seen to have
invited the courts to read into § 245 the requirement of
economic substance, the SCC refrained from such dynamic
interpretation. Even though the Explanatory Notes demonstrate a
legislative intention that the GAAR is intended to ensure that the
provisions of the ITA will “apply to transactions with real
economic substance, the Supreme Court held that economic
substance is relevant under the GAAR only if the provisions in
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question contemplate or refer to economic substance.”69 In
addition, “[v]ery few statutory provisions explicitly refer to
economic substance,” and “lack of economic substance is only
one factor to be considered and is insufficient by itself to
establish abusive tax avoidance.”70 It seems in consequence that
“economic substance is unlikely to be an important factor in the
application of the GAAR if the Supreme Court’s approach is
adhered to strictly by the lower courts.”71
As the above discussion reveals, the courts’ function in the
construction of statutes may be more dynamic than it is in the
construction of contracts, depending on how a statutory
provision has been phrased. Indeed, contractual interpretation
differs from statutory interpretation in that it is focused on
analyzing language in order to ascertain and give effect to the
intentions of the parties to the contract, while “constitutional and
statutory interpretation are not so much about the meaning of
language as about political debates over the proper role of the
courts in a democracy.”72
This distinction has important implications for choosing an
interpretative approach. In the construction of contracts the
court’s function is to ascertain and give effect to the historical
intentions of the parties. This necessitates a textual interpretation
that focuses on the parties’ intentions as they were objectively
conveyed (at the time the contract was concluded) through the
plain meaning of the expressed terms (and, where relevant, also
implied terms), read in light of their total context. Conversely, in
35143-aap_15-1 Sheet No. 12 Side A
11/14/2014 10:49:45

69. Arnold, supra n. 50, at 4; see also Judith Freedman, Converging Tracks? Recent
Developments in Canadian and UK Approaches to Tax Avoidance, 53 Canadian Tax J.
1038, 1039 (2005) (noting that “[o]ne might have expected that the GAAR would give a
legislative signal to judges to be bold, but it seems to have had the opposite effect of
making them all the more careful to protect the taxpayer”).
70. Arnold, supra n. 50, at 4.
71. Id.
72. Lord Hoffman, The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings, 114. S. Afr. L.J.
656, 672 (1997) (noting in addition that “disagreements between judges or between judges
and academics over questions of statutory interpretation . . . arouse the most extraordinary
passions,” and that “these disputes . . . are in essence political and concern the relationship
between the judges and the legislature”); see also Geoff R. Hall, Canadian Contractual
Interpretation Law 4 (LexisNexis Canada 2d ed. 2012) (quoting Hoffman, recognizing
differences between the interpretation of contracts and the interpretation of statutes, and
pointing out that judges involved in statutory interpretation can have “fundamental
disagreements about the nature of the exercise”).
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Placer Dome, 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 21.
2005 SCC 54 at ¶ 13.
Placer Dome, 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 22.
Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. R., 2011 SCC 63 at ¶ 66.
Id.
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73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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the construction of statutes the courts’ function can vary. Where
the legislature sets out specific and detailed rules and
requirements, this presumably signals the legislature’s intention
to have the statutory provision applied based on its plain
meaning in order to give effect to the legislature’s historical
intentions. As was explained by the SCC with respect to the
interpretation of the ITA, “because of the degree of precision
and detail characteristic of many tax provisions, a greater
emphasis has often been placed on textual interpretation where
taxation statutes are concerned.”73 Similarly, in Canada Trustco
the SCC stated that “[t]he Income Tax Act remains an
instrument dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific
consequences, inviting a largely textual interpretation.”74 On the
other hand, where the legislature sets out vague rules and
requirements, this presumably signals the legislature’s intention
to have the statutory provision applied with judicial discretion
by means of dynamic interpretation, which in turn would
necessitate a more contextual and purposive interpretation. As
was explained by the SCC, “where the words of a statute give
rise to more than one reasonable interpretation, the ordinary
meaning of words will play a lesser role, and greater recourse to
the context and purpose of the Act may be necessary.”75 Again,
this is exemplified by Canada’s GAAR. As the SCC recently
noted, the GAAR is a “legal mechanism whereby” Parliament
directs the court to go “behind the words of the legislation to
determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision or
provisions relied upon by the taxpayer.”76 And sometimes,
although the taxpayer’s transactions will be “in strict compliance
with the text of the relevant provisions relied upon, they may not
necessarily be in accord with their object, spirit or purpose.”77
Therefore, in comparison to the interpretation of
commercial contracts, statutory construction requires greater
flexibility, rather than limiting the courts to either textualist or
purposive approaches. This flexibility can be achieved by
following Canada’s unified approach, which requires the courts
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78. Placer Dome, 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 22.
79. Id. at ¶ 23; see also Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1 at
¶ 21 (quoting description of “precise and unequivocal” language from Canada Trustco).
80. Bell ExpressVu Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), 2010 MBQB 26 at ¶ 27 (citing Placer
Dome).
81. Singleton, 2001 SCC at ¶ 64.
82. Id.
83. Id. at ¶ 68.
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to undertake a textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation.78
The degree of emphasis that will be placed on any of these
factors—text, context, or general purpose—should, as the SCC
explained, be informed by the level of precision and clarity with
which the legislation has been drafted.79 As Justice Greenberg of
Manitoba’s Court of Queen’s Bench recently explained, “the
starting point in interpreting a statutory provision is the ordinary
meaning of the words used but, except where the words are
precise, one must consider the meaning of the words using a
purposive and contextual analysis.”80
It is worthwhile to consider the SCC’s criticism in
Singleton of an approach to statutory interpretation that focuses
on either the extreme of a plain-meaning approach or the
opposite extreme of a purposive interpretation (which it referred
to as the teleological approach), and its explanation for choosing
the middle ground made possible by the words-in-total-contexts
approach. As Justice LeBel explained there, the teleological
approach is problematic because starting from the statute’s
purposes risks “obscuring the meaning of the particular statutory
language” because of the court’s “enthusiasm to forward the
general statutory purpose.”81 Instead, then, “[c]areful attention
must always be taken to give effect to the particular language
Parliament chose to use.”82
As for the plain-meaning approach, he wrote in Singleton
that “it surely cannot mean that we are always to ignore context
when interpreting statutory language,” but “must be understood
to say that although context is always important, sweeping
considerations of general statutory purpose cannot outweigh the
specific statutory language chosen by Parliament.”83 Justice
LeBel continued by cautioning against “finding a single purpose
for the Act as a whole and using it to interpret the clear language
of specific provisions,” encouraging the Court to use those
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general purposes “only as a context to help elucidate the
meaning of the specific statutory language.”84 If used in this
way, the plain-meaning approach “is not inconsistent with the
basic thrust of the words-in-total-context approach.”85
Recognizing the words-in-total-context approach as the
preferred method for analyzing statutory language, Justice LeBel
characterized it as an analysis that “steers a middle course”
between the teleological and plain-meaning approaches and
allows a “more ‘open-textured’ approach to statutory
interpretation.”86 Equally important, it “ensures that clear
statutory language is not overlooked in order to carry out a
broad statutory purpose more effectively.”87
V. CONCLUSION

Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at ¶¶ 61–62.
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84.
85.
86.
87.
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Statutory interpretation in the United States continues to be
torn between the textualist and purposivist approaches, though
the new-textualist approach has been gaining dominance.
Commentators have argued that courts in the United States
should focus their approach on either one of those extremes. In
contrast, the SCC has, in recent years, opted for a middle ground
by applying a unified textual, contextual, and purposive
approach. This Canadian approach is preferable to the
dichotomy seen in the United States because it provides the
courts with the flexibility they require for statutory
interpretation. Depending on how specific and technical a
statutory provision’s phrasing, the Canadian approach enables
the court to properly ascertain the legislature’s intentions, either
by focusing on the legislature’s historical intentions or instead
by applying a more dynamic interpretation. Courts in the United
States should consider adopting this Canadian approach.

